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Abstract 
Most decision-making research in economics focuses on individual decisions. Yet, we know, 
from psychological research in particular, that individual preferences can be sensitive to social 
pressures. In this paper, we study the impact of a group environment on individual 
preferences for risky (i.e., known probabilities) and ambiguous (i.e., unknown probabilities) 
prospects. In our experiment, each participant was invited to make a series of lottery-choice 
decisions in two different conditions. In the Alone condition, individuals made private choices 
whereas in the Group condition, individuals belonged to a three-person group and group-
members’ choices were aggregated according to either a majority or unanimity rule. This 
design allows us to study the impact of a group environment on individuals’ attitude towards 
both risky and ambiguous prospects while controlling for the decision rule used in the group.  
Our experimental results show that when individuals are in the Group condition, they tend to 
be less risk averse and more ambiguity averse than when they are not part of a group (Alone 
condition). Our experiment also suggests that the decision rule matters as it shows that these 
two trends tend to be stronger when the group implements a unanimity rule. Specifically, we 
found that individuals who belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule are significantly 
less risk averse than individuals who belong to a group that relies on the majority rule. We 
obtained a similar – but non-significant – result under ambiguity.  
 
Keywords: group, unanimity, majority, preferences, risk, ambiguity. 
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Introduction  
Most experimental research on decision-making has focused on individual decisions and 
individual attitudes to risk and ambiguity, and has neglected the study of social influence on 
these decisions and preferences (Trautman and Vieider 2011). Yet, we know from 
psychological research in particular, that groups can exert different types of influence on 
individuals and that individuals can behave differently in a group environment and in a 
private setting (see e.g., Ambrus et al. 2009; Trautmann and Vieider 2011 for overviews). 
Studying group influence on individual decisions is therefore of utmost important, not least 
because in many economic and business contexts, decisions are made by individuals (e.g., 
senior managers) who operate in a group environment (e.g., top management teams).   
A growing literature in economics precisely attempts at better understanding how 
individuals make decisions in a group environment (Harrison et al. 2007; Masclet et al. 2009; 
Viscusi et al. 2011). Importantly, this literature differs from the literature on group decision 
making, which focuses on situations where a whole group makes a unique decision after 
deliberation (Blinder and Morgan 2005; Kocher et al. 2006; Baker et al. 2008; Shupp and 
Williams 2008; Ambrus et al. 2009; Sheremata and Zhang 2010; Deck et al. 2012; Zhang and 
Casari 2012). A main conclusion from the emerging body of literature on individual decisions 
made in a group environment is that individuals are more risk averse when they are in a group 
setting that when they are alone (see, e.g., Masclet et al. 2009).  
However, we still know very little about the forces driving this result. Some papers 
suggest that a factor such as the probability of gain impacts on individual’s attitude to risk. 
For instance, Masclet et al. (2009) reported that when the probability of gain is low, 
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individuals who do not belong to a group are less risk averse than individuals who belong to a 
group. In addition, a critical review of the existing literature suggests that the nature of the 
collective decision rule that the group uses to aggregate individual preferences might matter. 
For instance, Harrison et al. (2007) found no difference between attitudes towards risk 
reported by individuals who belong to a group and by individuals who do not belong to a 
group.  This result is somewhat at odd with results from other studies, such as Masclet et al. 
(2009). But, in their study, Harrison et al. (2007) used a majority decision rule, whereas 
Masclet et al. (2009) had used a unanimity rule.  
The purpose of this paper is to complement prior economic research on the impact of a 
group environment on individuals’ decisions by testing for the effect of two variables, 
namely, the type of decision rule (majority vs. unanimity), and the source of uncertainty (risk 
vs. ambiguity). In other words, we ask the following questions: Do individuals in a group 
environment exhibit attitudes to risk and ambiguity that differ from the one they exhibit when 
they are alone? Does the decision rule used in the group matter? Our research therefore also 
contributes to ambiguity research (Wakker 2010), which so far has mainly focused on 
individuals’ attitudes towards ambiguity and has neglected group influence (see Curley et al. 
(1986), and Trautman et al. (2008) for two noticeable exceptions).  
To test for the effects of these two variables on individuals’ decisions, we created an 
experiment in which the participants faced a series of lottery-choice decisions (under both risk 
and ambiguity) and had to make choices Alone and as part of a three-person Group. In both 
cases, the participants provided their individual choices – that we used to estimate their 
individual attitude to risk and ambiguity. Yet, in the group environment, the participants had 
to report their individual choices knowing that such choices would then be combined with the 
choices of the other two group-members, using either a majority or a unanimity rule. Group 
members received information about the other group members’ choice, but they could not talk 
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to each other prior to making their decisions. This design thus allows focusing on the sole 
effect of normative influence of groups on individual decisions, and discards the possibility of 
any informational influence (Ambrus et al. 2009).  
Our experimental results first show that a group environment decreases individuals’ 
degree of risk aversion. We indeed found that when individuals are in a group environment 
(Group condition), they tend to be less risk averse than when they are not part of a group 
(Alone condition). Second, our study shows that the effect of the group environment on 
individual attitudes to ambiguity is different from its effect on individual attitude to risk. We 
indeed found that individuals in a group environment tend to be more ambiguity averse than 
individuals who are not part of a group environment. Third, our experiment shows that the 
decision rule (majority vs. unanimity) matters as we found that a group’s influence on 
individuals’ attitude to risk and ambiguity is stronger when the group implements a unanimity 
rule than when it implements a majority rule. Specifically, we found that individuals who 
belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule are less risk averse than individuals who 
belong to a group that relies on the majority rule. We obtained a similar – but non-significant 
– result under ambiguity.   
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the experiment. Section 2 is 
devoted to experimental results while Section 3 contains the discussion and conclusion.   
1. Experiment 
To address our research questions on the effect of a group environment on individual 
attitudes to risk and to ambiguity, we designed an experiment which had four main 
characteristics.  First, in our experiment, all our participants made a series of lottery-choice 
decisions under two different sources of uncertainty, namely risk – where the probabilities of 
the lotteries are known – and ambiguity – where the probabilities of the lotteries are 
imprecise.  Second, all our participants answered the same series of 10 risky (resp. 
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ambiguous) lottery choices in two different conditions:  in one condition, the participants 
were part of a three-person group (hereafter “Group condition”) and they received 
information about the other group-members choices, whereas in the other condition, the 
participants were not part of a group, and their decisions were thus entirely private (hereafter 
“Alone condition”). The order of presentation of this variable was randomized in order to 
minimize potential order effects (i.e., some participants faced the Alone condition first, 
whereas other participants faced the Group condition first). Third, in the Group condition, we 
introduced two treatments: some participants belonged to a group implementing a majority 
decision rule (hereafter Majority group treatment), while other participants were assigned to a 
group using a unanimity decision rule (hereafter Unanimity group treatment).  Fourth and 
finally, when answering the series of lottery choices in the Alone condition, the order of 
presentation of the uncertain context was random (i.e., some participants started with the risky 
lotteries whereas other participants started with the ambiguous lotteries). In the Group 
condition, due to matching constraints, all participants started with risky prospects followed 
by ambiguous prospects.  
1.1 Decisions under Risk: The Multiple Price List Procedure   
We used the Multiple Price List (MPL) procedure of Holt and Laury (2002) to elicit attitudes 
towards risk. This procedure is one of the most common approaches used to elicit risk 
attitudes (Harrison et al. 2005; Holt and Laury 2005; Andersen et al. 2006). As Table A.1 in 
the Appendix shows, in this procedure, each participant is presented with ten sequential 
choices between two lotteries. For each binary choice, the participant has to choose between a 
safe lottery (option A) and a risky lottery (option B). By definition, a risk-neutral subject 
switches from one type of lottery to the other one when the two lotteries have the same 
expected value. In Table A.1, the risk neutrality threshold is 4 (i.e., risk-neutral subjects 
switch between the fourth and fifth choices).  
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Decision context (Alone vs. Group). In the Alone condition, the participants had to 
make 10 sequential choices, as explained above. This was a typical MPL task. In the Group 
condition, we randomly created three-person groups. We used a computerized procedure 
similar to that of Masclet et al. (2009) where each group member indicated, through the 
computer, his/her individual choice for each of the ten choices, to the other group members. 
The members of the group could not communicate prior to making their choice but once each 
group member had made his/her choice, these choices were made public to the other group 
members. The three choices were then combined according to the pre-determined rule 
(majority or unanimity). It is important to notice that the participants were randomly allocated 
to a different three-person group for each of the 10 lottery choices of the MPL procedure. 
Each participant therefore completed the 10 binary choices of the MPL procedure (in the 
same order as in the Alone condition) in 10 different three-person group environments. The 
fact that the composition of the groups changed after each binary choice is not an issue in our 
experiment because we compare the choices made by individuals as part of a group and 
alone.
1
 In addition, because we focus on the normative influence of groups (Ambrus et al. 
2009) – and not their informational influence as deliberation amongst group members was not 
possible – the identity of the group members is not at stake and what matters is the social 
influence that groups (whatever their composition) exert on individuals’ attitude to risk. Note 
that the decision context is a within-subject variable, which means that all our participants 
were exposed to both the Alone and the Group conditions. 
Decision rule (Majority vs. Unanimity). In the Group condition, some participants 
were in the Majority group treatment while others were in the Unanimity group treatment 
(between-subject variable). The experimental protocol is slightly different for these two 
                                                           
1
  Masclet et al. (2009) also reshuffled the groups after each binary choice in order to avoid reputational 
effect. If the groups are fixed for 10 choices, we cannot control for collusion or sanction.  
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groups of participants, in order to accommodate for the specificity of the group decision rule. 
In the Majority group treatment, because we had three-person groups, and binary options, the 
computer could always combine the group-members choices in order to compute the group 
choice. For instance, even if two group members have different preferences (i.e., one group 
member chooses the option A, whereas the other group member chooses the option B), 
whatever the decision of the third group member, the computer can compute the group choice. 
In the Unanimity group treatment, on the contrary, not all configurations of individual 
preferences allow the computer to implement the decision rule successfully. We therefore 
implemented an iterative process. For each binary choice, group members could play up to 
five trials. When the output of a trial is a unanimous decision – i.e., the three members chose 
the same option – the participants were made aware that a unanimous decision had been 
reached, and they were assigned to another group to address the next binary choice of the 
MPL procedure. If no unanimous choice was reached, each participant was made aware of the 
choices of the other group members, and was asked to address the same binary choice in a 
new trial. At the end of the fifth trial, if no unanimous decision had been reached, the 
computer announced that result to the group members, and each participant was assigned 
randomly to another group to answer the next binary choice of the MPL procedure.   
It is noteworthy that there is a main difference between the two decision rules in our 
experiment: individuals assigned to a group implementing a unanimity rule have no guarantee 
that an unanimous decision will be reached (even after five trials), whereas the majority 
decision can always be reached in just one trial because we have three-person groups and a 
binary choice. The iterative process in the unanimity rule case is almost an intrinsic 
characteristic of this type of rule, as it would not make sense to implement such a rule without 
allowing the participants to iterate and perhaps converge towards a unanimous decision after a 
series of trials. This specificity of the unanimity rule also allows us to have a richer 
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understanding of group influence on individual attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, because 
we can study the dynamics leading towards a unanimous decision.  We analyse the results 
associated to this methodological choice in sub-section 2.3.  
Individual’s risk attitude. The analysis of individual decisions under risk is composed of 
two parts. First, we realize a model-free analysis about individual decisions under risk. 
Specifically, our analysis focuses on switching points (i.e., the points when the individuals 
change their preferences between the gambles situated on the right and left columns). Second, 
we also quantify risk preferences assuming expected utility
2
 with power utility (see for 
instance, Gollier 2011; Akay et al. 2012). More precisely, to quantify the relative risk 
aversion parameter of each participant’s utility function, we used a Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) characterisation of risk attitudes, with U(x) = x
 (1-r)
/(1-r), for x > 0, where r 
≠ 1 is the CRRA coefficient (see parameter r in Table 1). The switching point in the MPL list 
provides a direct inference of a CRRA index interval. 
1.2 Decisions under ambiguity: Chakravarty and Roy’s (2009) procedure 
Two main types of procedure exist to elicit decision-makers’ attitudes towards ambiguity: 
model-free procedures (Cohen et al. 2010), and procedures rooted in a specific theoretical 
model (Halevy 2007), such as Chakravarty and Roy’s (2009) procedure, which is consistent 
with Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s (2005) model (hereafter KMM). In this research, we 
used Chakravarty and Roy’s (2009) procedure (hereafter CR) because it extends Holt and 
Laury’s (2002) procedure (MPL) to ambiguity. Specifically, CR’s procedure mimics the MPL 
                                                           
2
  From its earliest days, expected utility theory has met several criticisms, leading the Prospect theory to 
become the best-supported alternative (Wakker 2010). However, estimation of more flexible functions requires 
more information and therefore more complex elicitation procedures (Abdellaoui 2000). In addition, there is also 
evidence showing that EUT is as good as PT to characterize behaviors (Harrison and Ruström 2009; Couture and 
Reynaud 2009). Finally, in the context of choice under uncertainty, expected utility theory has provided the most 
detailed and richest body of applications so far (Camerer 1995). 
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procedure in that it asks participants to make a series of 10 choices between a non-ambiguous 
(or risky) prospect, and an ambiguous prospect. Asking individuals to make a decision 
between a non-ambiguous prospect and an ambiguous prospect is the most common approach 
in economics to study attitude to ambiguity (see, e.g., Camerer and Weber 1992; Halevy 
2007; Akay et al. 2012). 
Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the series of ten sequential choices that the 
participants faced. Each choice consists of a non-ambiguous option (option A) and an 
ambiguous option (option B).  In this table, an ambiguity-neutral subject is indifferent 
between the two options at the fifth binary choice. It is noteworthy that – as in the risky 
context – all the participants answered the series of ten sequential binary choices twice, once 
in the Alone condition, and once in the Group condition.  
Decision context (Alone vs. Group) and decision rule (Majority vs. Unanimity). The 
procedure to create the three-person group and the system of iterations are similar to those 
used in the risk context (see the sections above).   
Individual’s ambiguity attitude. As in the risk context, the analysis of individual decisions 
under ambiguity is composed of two parts. First, we conducted a model-free analysis of 
individual decisions under ambiguity through the analysis of switching points. Second, we 
specified a theoretical model to further analyzed individuals’ attitude to ambiguity. 
Specifically, we used the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005). 
3
 We choose this 
model for two reasons. First, this model introduces a simple and easily interpretable way to 
capture ambiguity aversion and it is popular in economics today (see e.g., Treich 2010; 
Gollier 2011; Brunette et al. 2012). Second, it differentiates attitudes towards risk from 
                                                           
3
  Despite the fact that there is a rich and still growing literature on modeling ambiguity attitudes, 
empirical evidence on the relative performance of these different models is still scarce (see e.g., Etner et al. 
2012; Baillon and Bleichrodt 2013 for systematic reviews). Recent experimental studies nonetheless suggest 
that, despite heterogeneity of behaviour among individuals, the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. 
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attitudes towards ambiguity. Specifically: KMM(x) = Eφ(EU(x)), where the function U 
characterises the participant’s attitude towards risk and the function φ characterises his/her 
attitude towards ambiguity. Second, Chakravarty and Roy’s (2009) procedure is rooted in the 
KMM model – and in this procedure, the number of non-ambiguous lottery choices sets the 
bounds for the ambiguity aversion parameter (see the s parameter in Table 3).  
1.3. Participants and incentives 
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory of Forest Economics in Nancy (France), in 
October 2009. Sixty students (31 men and 29 women; average age = 21.5 years) were 
recruited from different study programmes. Four sessions of 15 students were run, so that 
each treatment (Majority and Unanimity) contained 30 participants. The experiment was 
computerized and scripts were programmed using the z-tree platform (Fischbacher 2007). 
Each session lasted approximately two hours and ended with a short demographic survey 
including questions about the participants’ age, sex and professional activity.  
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected two choices, one from 
the Alone condition and one from the Group condition. When the computer selected a binary 
choice question in the Group condition (with a unanimity rule) where no group choice was 
possible, the programme randomly selected another binary choice question up to select a 
binary choice question for which a group choice existed.
4
 For each of these two randomly 
selected choices, the computer determined the participant’s payoffs. The sum of the two 
payoffs represented the final payment of the respondent. In our experiment, the payments of 
subjects varied between 0 and 26 Euros with an average of 11 Euros.  
                                                           
(2005) is the model that best captures individual behaviors under ambiguity (e.g., Halevy 2007; Ahn et al. 2009; 
Andersen et al. 2009; Hayashi and Wada 2010). 
4
  In Masclet et al. (2009), the computer programme randomly selected one of the two possible options. 
Zhang and Casari (2012) associated a zero payoff to disagreement, a procedure known as « strong unanimity ».  
In our experiment, we decided to adopt a different approach, and did not force agreement nor used the ‘strong 
unanimity’ approach so that the final payoff really reflects the choices the participants made. 
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2.  Experimental results 
First, we compare participants’ risk and ambiguity preferences in the Alone condition 
with their risk and ambiguity preferences in the Group condition (within-subject variables) 
(Section 2.1). Second, we compare participants’ attitudes to risk and ambiguity in a Group 
environment under a majority rule and under a unanimity decision rule (Section 2.2). Finally, 
we extend the analysis by studying the determinants of individual decisions made in group 
with a unanimity rule (section 2.3) and the link between risk aversion and ambiguity (section 
and 2.4).      
2.1 Individual decisions made alone and as part of a group 
Individual decisions under risk. Table 1 provides information on the choice 
frequencies for individual decisions made in the Alone and Group conditions. Consistent with 
previous works’ results (see Holt and Laury 2002; Masclet et al. 2009), most players are risk 
averse and choose on average more than four safe options (around 77% in the Alone 
condition, and 75% in the Group condition). A One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows 
that the number of safe choices is significantly different from the neutrality threshold of 4 safe 
choices in both conditions (z = 5.847 and p = 0.000 in the Alone condition; z = 5.937 and p = 
0.000 in the Group condition). This means that our participants exhibit risk-aversion in both 
the Alone and Group conditions.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
More, the number of safe choice is slightly lower in the Group condition (5.38) than in the 
Alone condition (5.67) but this difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon related-
samples signed-rank test: z = -1.535 and p = 0.125). Figure 1 shows the proportion of safe 
option A for each of the ten decisions.  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
The dashed line shows predicted behaviour for a risk-neutral participant: s/he chooses A for 
the first four decisions, and subsequently B. In the Group condition, and for most of the 
decisions, participants tend to exhibit lower levels of risk aversion than in the Alone 
condition. However, a Related-Samples Friedman’s Two-way analysis of variance by ranks 
test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions between the individual decisions in 
the Alone and Group conditions (p = 0.123). This result is in line with the Wilcoxon test result 
above, and confirms the finding that in our experiment individual attitudes to risk were not 
significantly impacted by the group environment.  
Table 2 provides the results of a random effect probit model with the safe choice 
(option A) as the dependent variable.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
These results show that Age has no significant effect on the probability of choosing the safe 
option, which is consistent with Masclet et al. (2009). In addition, we found that being a man 
significantly reduces the probability of choosing the safe option (see the negative coefficient 
associated to Gender). This result is in line with past research showing that on average 
women are more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman 2008). The coefficient associated 
to the variable representing the group decision rule (Rule), is negative and significant, which 
means that the unanimity rule (vs. the majority rule) has a negative effect on the probability of 
choosing the safe option. Then, individuals who are part of a Unanimity group treatment are 
significantly less risk averse than individuals who are in the Majority group treatment. We 
also found that the probability of choosing the safe option falls as the probability of the higher 
payoff increases (Prob) and increases when individuals are in the Group condition 
(Alone_Group). Last, we found that the coefficient associated with the interaction variable 
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“Prob*Alone_Group” is negative and significant, showing that individuals in the Group 
condition become progressively less risk-averse as the probability of the higher payoff rises. 
This result may be decomposed in two effects. First, if the probability of the higher payoff 
increases, then the probability of choosing the safe option falls. Second, in the MPL 
procedure, a higher number of safe choices is associated to a higher level of risk aversion, so 
that, a reduction in the probability of choosing the safe option corresponds to a lower degree 
of risk aversion. This last result thus confirms our previous findings. 
Individual decisions under ambiguity. Experimental studies have usually studied 
attitude to ambiguity in “private” settings and have reported that individuals are ambiguity-
averse or ambiguity-neutral in the gain domain (Camerer and Weber 1992; Di Mauro and 
Maffioletti 2004; Chakravarty and Roy 2009; Wakker 2010). The few papers who studied 
individuals’ attitude to ambiguity in a group environment have reported that ambiguity 
aversion increases because of the fear of negative evaluation by others (see, e.g., Curley et al. 
1986; Trautmann et al. 2008). Our results tend to support this trend. However, in our 
experiment, the effect of the group environment on individual attitude to ambiguity is not 
always significant, as we explain below.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
First, we found that both in the Alone and Group conditions, the participants were 
significantly averse to ambiguity. As table 3 shows that the mean numbers of non-ambiguous 
choices are consistently greater than five – the ambiguity neutrality threshold in the CR 
procedure. In addition, a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms that ambiguity 
aversion is significant in both conditions (z = 3.094 and p = 0.002; z = 2.978 and p = 0.003 
respectively).  
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Second, table 3 shows that the proportion of ambiguity averse individuals is slightly 
higher in the Group condition (46.6%) than in the Alone condition (43.3%), which suggests 
that a group environment increases ambiguity aversion, as previously reported in Trautmann 
et al. 2008 for instance.  Figure 2, which reports the proportion of non-ambiguous choices for 
each of the ten decisions, gives further information about this trend. The dashed line 
represents predicted behaviour for an ambiguity-neutral participant: s/he chooses A for the 
first five decisions, and subsequently B. We can see that individuals in the Group condition 
tend to report higher levels of ambiguity aversion for most of the decisions, except for non-
ambiguous lotteries with smaller payoffs.  A Related-Samples Friedman’s Two way analysis 
of variance by ranks test however, cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions 
between the two distributions (Alone and Group conditions) (p = 0.546). More, a Wilcoxon 
related-samples signed-rank test reveals no significant difference between the two mean 
numbers of non-ambiguous choices. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Third, to complement these analyses, we ran a random effect probit model using the 
non-ambiguous choice (option A) as the dependent variable. Table 2 reports the results of this 
model. It shows that two standard demographic variables (Age and Gender) do not 
significantly affect the probability of choosing the non-ambiguous option. Table 2 also shows 
that the coefficient associated to the variable representing the collective decision rule (Rule), 
is negative but non-significant (p = 0.115), which means that individuals in the Unanimity 
group treatment tend to be less ambiguity averse than individuals in the Majority group 
treatment, but this effect – which is similar to the effect observed under risk – is not 
statistically significant. We also found that the probability of choosing the non-ambiguous 
option falls when decisions are made in groups (Alone_Group) and increases as the higher 
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payoff of non-ambiguous option increases (Payoff). Last, and importantly the interaction 
variable “Payoff*Alone_Group” has a significant and positive coefficient, showing that 
individuals in the Group condition become more ambiguity-averse as the higher payoff of 
non-ambiguous option increases. Two effects may explain such a result: i) if the higher payoff 
of the non-ambiguous option increases, then the probability of choosing the non-ambiguous 
option rises; and ii) in CR’s procedure, an increase in the probability of choosing the non-
ambiguous option is associated to a higher level of ambiguity aversion. This last result 
validates our conclusion.  
2.2 The decision rule in the Group condition  
In this section, we focus on the decisions that our participants made in the two treatments 
(Unanimity vs. Majority) that we implemented in the Group condition in order to unpack the 
effect of the decision rule on individuals’ attitude to risk and ambiguity.   
Individual decisions under risk. Under the Unanimity group treatment, individuals 
made on average 5.40 safe choices when they were alone and 4.97 safe choices when they 
were in the group environment. A Wilcoxon related-samples signed-rank test reveals that this 
difference is significant (z = -2.077 and p = 0.038). Under the Majority group treatment, 
individuals made on average 5.93 safe choice when they were alone, and 5.80 safe choices 
when they were in the group environment, but the difference is not significant (Wilcoxon 
related-samples signed-rank test : z = -0.303 and p = 0.762). Thus, when they are in the 
Unanimity Group treatment individuals are found to be significantly less risk-averse than 
when they are in the Alone condition, while when they are in the Majority group treatment, 
this trend is also visible, but it is not significant.  
Moreover, in our experiment, individuals in the Majority group treatment made an 
average 5.80 non-risky choices, while, individuals in the Unanimity group treatment made 
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4.97 non-risky choices on average. Thus, in both treatments, most of players choose on 
average more than four safe options, which means that they are risk averse. A One-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms that risk aversion is significant (z = 4.606 and p = 0.000 
in the Majority group treatment; z = 3.796 and p = 0.000 in the Unanimity group treatment). 
This result is consistent with previous works’ results (see Harrison et al. 2007 for the majority 
rule; Masclet et al. 2009 for the unanimity rule). Importantly, a further tests also shows that 
participants in the Majority group treatment are significantly more risk averse (5.80) than 
participants in the Unanimity group treatment (4.97) (Mann-Whitney U test: z = -2.989 and p 
= 0.003).  
Individual decisions under ambiguity. Under the Unanimity group treatment, 
individuals made on average 5.37 non-ambiguous choices when alone, and 5.20 non-
ambiguous choices when in a group environment. However, a Wilcoxon related-samples 
signed-rank test reveals that this difference is not significant (z = -0.340 and p = 0.709). 
Under the Majority group treatment, individuals made on average 6.10 non-ambiguous 
choices when alone, and 5.63 non-ambiguous choices when in a group environment. Again, 
the difference is not significant (Wilcoxon related-samples signed-rank test: z = -1.513 and p 
= 0.130). Individuals in group (whatever the decision rule) thus tend to be less ambiguity-
averse than individuals alone but the effect is not statistically significant. 
In the Majority group treatment, individuals made an average of 5.63 non-ambiguous 
choices, which is significantly higher than the neutrality threshold of five non-ambiguous 
choices (One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z = 2.863 and p = 0.004). In the Unanimity 
group treatment, we observe that individuals made on average 5.20 non-ambiguous choices, 
which is higher than the neutrality threshold but the difference is not significant (Wilcoxon 
one-sample signed-rank test: z = 1.177 and p = 0.239). In other words, we found that 
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individuals who belong to a group tend to be ambiguity-averse but ambiguity aversion is 
statistically significant in the Majority group treatment only. This suggests that the majority 
rule generates more ambiguity aversion than the unanimity rule. However, a Mann-Whitney 
U test shows that the difference between 5.63 and 5.20 is not significant (z = -1.301 and p = 
0.193). 
2.3 Determinants of individual decisions made in the unanimity group treatment  
In the Unanimity group treatment, each group had up to five iterations to reach a unanimous 
decision on each of the 10 binary choices. We consider the evolution of disagreements within 
individuals in the Unanimity group treatment. 
Figures 3 and 4 show that both in the risk and the ambiguity contexts, individuals in 
the Unanimity group treatment reached a unanimous decision at the first iteration in decision 
3 only (and also in decision 9 under ambiguity). In all the other decisions, two or more 
iterations were needed to reach a unanimous decision – when such a decision emerged. 
Interestingly, the two figures report similar percentages of disagreement across the probability 
range (i.e., decision number). They show, in particular, that percentages of disagreement are 
higher for middle probability decisions (i.e., intermediate decisions 4 to 7) than for low- and 
high-probability decisions (decisions 1 to 3 and 8 to 10, respectively). For example, we 
observed 80% of disagreements in the first iteration for decisions 5 or 6 in the risk context, 
and 70% of disagreements in the first iteration for decisions 5 or 7 in the ambiguity context. 
In contrast, the frequency of disagreement is equal to 10% in the first iteration for decision 10 
in both the risk and ambiguity context. 
INSERT FIGURES 3 and 4 HERE 
The two figures also clearly show that the proportion of disagreement decreases with the 
number of iteration rounds. In most cases, the iterative process thus allowed individuals who 
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are part of a group to converge towards a unanimous decision. For instance, the probability of 
disagreement in the fifth iteration for the risky decision 5 is equal to 20%, whereas it is 80% 
in the first iteration. These results are similar to those of Masclet et al. (2009) who observed 
that for decision 7, the probability of disagreement is 75% in the first iteration and decreases 
to 12% in the fifth iteration. Under ambiguity, the probability of disagreement at decision 7 
drops from 70% in the first iteration to 10% in the fifth iteration.  
Figure 5 below gives the changes in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity in the Alone 
and Unanimity group conditions. It shows that almost 26.67% of the participants exhibited the 
same attitude towards risk in these two conditions. The same proportion exhibited more risk 
aversion in the Unanimity group condition than in the Alone condition. In addition, around 
46.67% of the participants exhibited less risk aversion in the Unanimity group condition than 
in the Alone condition. This means that the Unanimity group condition leads to lower levels 
of risk aversion than the Alone condition. In the case of real group decision, such a result is 
characteristic of a “risky shift” (Wallach et al. 1964; Brown 1986; Aronson et al. 2005). In 
addition, this result extends the “other-evaluation” argument developed under ambiguity 
(Curley et al. 1986; Trautman et al. 2008; Keck et al. 2012) to risk: individuals, in making a 
choice, anticipate that others will evaluate her/his decision, and so, make the choice that is 
perceived to be most justifiable to others, the less risky one. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Figure 5 also our results show that 23.3% of the participants had the same attitude towards 
ambiguity in the Alone and Unanimity group conditions. The participants whose attitude 
towards ambiguity changed across tasks were evenly split: 40% were more ambiguity-averse 
in the Unanimity group condition than in the Alone condition, and 36.7% were less 
ambiguity-averse in the Unanimity group condition than in the Alone condition. This result 
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suggests a potential ambiguity neutrality convergence when the group adopts a unanimity rule 
(Curley et al. 1986; Charness et al. 2012).  Overall, these observations show that individuals 
do not exhibit the same preferences when they belong to a unanimity group and when they are 
alone.  
2.4 Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion  
In the Alone condition, we find a positive correlation between the number of non-risky 
choices and non-ambiguous choices (Spearman coefficient = 0.407; p = 0.001). This result is 
consistent with those of Chakravarty and Roy (2009) who report a positive and significant 
correlation between individuals’ attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. In the Group condition, 
we do not find any significant correlations between risk and ambiguity attitudes in either the 
Majority group treatment (Spearman coefficient = 0.138; p = 0.466) or the Unanimity group 
treatment (Spearman coefficient = -0.217; p = 0.249).  
3. Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on group social influence on individual 
decision-making in two ways. We consider the impact of the source of uncertainty (risk or 
ambiguity) and we also study the impact of the decision rule (unanimity or majority). These 
two factors have been neglected so far.  
Our experiment extends past research on the effect of a group environment on 
individual attitude to risk and ambiguity (Harrison et al.  2007; Masclet et al. 2009 ; Curley et 
al. 1986, Trautman et al. 2008, Viscusi et al. 2011). We observe that individuals who are part 
of a group (whatever the decision rule) are i) significantly averse to risk, but ii) tend to be less 
risk averse than when they are alone; and iii) are averse to ambiguity and iv) tend to be more 
averse to ambiguity than when they are alone. The fact that differences between attitudes to 
risk (resp. ambiguity) in the group environment and alone are not statistically different might 
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come from the fact that we did not take into account the possible effect of the decision rule, as 
we explain below.  
In order to understand the impact of a group environment on individual attitudes to 
risk and to ambiguity, it is important to look at the impact of the decision rule.  Our study 
provides important results in that respect. Our experiment first shows that if attitude to risk 
does not seem to be sensitive to the decision rule – i.e., we observe significant degrees of risk 
aversion in both the unanimity and the majority groups – attitude to ambiguity, on the 
contrary, seems to be sensitive to the decision rule that the group adopts.  Indeed, we found 
that only individuals who belong to a group implementing a majority rule are significantly 
averse to ambiguity, while individuals who belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule 
are ambiguity neutral. Second, the comparison between attitudes to risk (resp. ambiguity) 
alone and in a group shows that only certain conditions lead to significant differences. To sum 
up, we found that when they belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule, individuals are 
less risk averse than when they do not belong to a group – the same effect is visible, but not 
significant with a majority rule. Our findings thus are at odd with Masclet et al.’s (2009) 
findings which report that the unanimity rule increases individual’s degree of risk aversion. 
They are however consistent with Harrison et al. (2007) who reported no significant 
difference between individual attitudes to risk in a group environment and alone when a 
majority rule was adopted.  With respect to attitude to ambiguity, we found that the majority 
rule tends to generate more ambiguity aversion than the unanimity rule.  
This paper can be extended in several ways. For example, future research could focus 
on the impact of the size of the group. Most studies so far have used three-person groups 
(Baker et al. 2008; Masclet et al. 2009) but the size of the group could matter. Other research 
could also consider more naturalistic settings, where group members can discuss and interact 
before making a decision. In our experiment, like in Masclet et al.’s (2009) experiment, 
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participants did not interact with each other when making decisions in the Group condition. 
Yet, it would be interesting to implement an experiment where interaction between group 
members is allowed such as “cheap talk” for instance (Baker et al. 2008).  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Risk aversion classification based on lottery choices: Alone vs. Group 
conditions (in %) 
Number 
of safe 
choices 
Bounds for relative 
risk aversion 
U(x)=x
1-r
/1-r 
Classification Alone 
condition 
Group 
condition 
0 and 1 r < -0.95 Highly risk-loving   
2 -0,95 < r < -0.49 Very risk-loving   
3 -0.49 < r < -0.15 Risk-loving 6.66   
4 -0.15 < r < 0.15 Risk-neutral 16.66 25 
5 0.15 < r < 0.41 Slightly risk-averse 23.33 23.33 
6 0.41 < r < 0.68 Risk-averse 25 38.33 
7 0.68 < r < 0.97 Very risk-averse 18.33 13.33 
8 0.97 < r < 1.37 Highly risk-averse 6.66  
9 and 10 1.37 < r Stay in bed 3.33   
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Table 2. Probability of safe and non-ambiguous choice: Random effects probit  
 
 Risk Ambiguity  
 Coef. Coef.  
Age -0.139 
 (0.076) 
-0.016 
(0.058) 
 
Gender -0.622**  
(0.322) 
-0.212 
(0.244) 
 
Rule -0.547*  
(0.304) 
-0.364 
(0.231) 
 
Alone_Group 2.214***  
(0.790) 
-3.235*** 
(0.720) 
 
Prob -9.948*** 
(0.851) 
  
Prob*Alone_Group -3.832*** 
(1.273) 
  
Payoff  0.619*** 
(0.047) 
 
Payoff*Alone_Group  0.375*** 
(0.088) 
 
Constant 7.051*** 
(1.705) 
-4.071*** 
(1.267) 
 
Lnsig2u 0.016 
(0.303) 
-0.595 
(0.302) 
 
Sigma_u 1.008  
(0.153) 
0.743 
(0.112) 
 
Rho 0.504 
 (0.076) 
0.355 
(0.069) 
 
Number of observations 1173 1185  
Log-likelihood -221.3989 -287.91929  
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
Gender is a binary variable equal to 1 for men and 0 for women. 
Rule is a binary variable equal to 1 for unanimity and 0 for majority. 
Alone_Group is a binary variable equal to 1 if the decision is made in the Group condition 
and 0 if the decision is made in the Alone condition. 
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Table 3. Ambiguity aversion classification based on lottery choices: Alone vs. Group 
conditions (in %) 
Number of 
non-
ambiguous 
choices 
Bounds for ambiguity 
aversion 
KMM(x)=Ej(EU(x)) with 
j(x)=x
s
 
Classification Alone 
condition 
Group 
condition 
0  s > 1.92 Extremely amb.-loving   
1 1.92 ≤ s < 1.59 Highly amb.-loving   
2 1.59 ≤ s < 1.35 Very amb.-loving    
3 1.35 ≤ s < 1.15 Amb.-loving  5  
4 1.15 ≤ s < 1 Slightly amb.-loving 18.33 20 
5 1 ≤ s < 0.86 Amb.-neutral 33.33 33.33 
6 0.86 ≤ s < 0.75 Slightly amb.-averse 13.33 35 
7 0.75 ≤ s < 0.66 Amb.-averse 11.66 8.33 
8 0.66 ≤ s < 0.43 Very amb.-averse 13.33 3.33 
9 0.43 ≤ s < 0.30 Highly amb.-averse   
10 s ≥ 0.30 Extremely amb.-averse 5  
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Proportion 
choosing safe 
option A 
Figure 1. Proportion of safe choices for each decision: Alone vs. Group conditions 
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Figure 2. Proportion of non-ambiguous choices in each decision: Alone vs. Group 
conditions 
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Figure 3. Frequency of disagreements for each decision: Group condition under risk 
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Figure 4. Frequency of disagreements for each decision: Group condition under 
ambiguity 
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       % 
Figure 5. Link between individual attitudes towards risk and ambiguity  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. The ten-paired lottery-choice decisions under risk (adapted from Holt and 
Laury, 2002) 
 
Option A Option B 
Decisions Prob. P Gains Prob. (1-P) Gains Prob. P Gains Prob. (1-P) Gains Choice  
1 10% 7 € 90% 5 € 10% 13 € 90% 0 €    A       B 
2 20% 7 € 80% 5 € 20% 13 € 80% 0 €    A       B 
3 30% 7 € 70% 5 € 30% 13 € 70% 0 €    A       B 
4 40% 7 € 60% 5 € 40% 13 € 60% 0 €    A       B 
5 50% 7 € 50% 5 € 50% 13 € 50% 0 €    A       B 
6 60% 7 € 40% 5 € 60% 13 € 40% 0 €    A       B 
7 70% 7 € 30% 5 € 70% 13 € 30% 0 €    A       B 
8 80% 7 € 20% 5 € 80% 13 € 20% 0 €    A       B 
9 90% 7 € 10% 5 € 90% 13 € 10% 0 €    A       B 
10 100% 7 € 0% 5 € 100% 13 € 0% 0 €    A       B 
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Table A.2. The ten-paired lottery-choice decision under ambiguity (adapted from 
Chakravarty and Roy, 2009) 
 
Choose a colour:   BLACK   ○             WHITE  ○ 
 
Option A: urn A  Option B: urn B 
In urn A, the distribution of 
balls is 5 black and 5 white 
In urn B, the possible 
distribution  of balls is not known 
The chosen 
colour 
is obtained 
The chosen 
colour  
is not obtained  
The chosen 
colour 
is obtained 
The chosen 
colour  
is not obtained  Decisio
ns Gains Gains Gains Gains Choice  
1 13 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
2 12 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
3 11 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
4 10 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
5 9 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
6 8 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
7 7 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
8 6 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
9 4 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
10 2 € 0 € 9 € 0 €    A       B 
 
 
